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I 
While the desire for limited liability has played its part in 
increasing the use of the corporate device among the smaller in- 
dustrial units, it alone is not responsible for such extensive use 
of the corporation arpong the larger industrial units. A primary 
factor there has been absentee ownership, attendant on the wide 
distribution of securities. The corporate device has lent itself 
peculiarly well to the public marketing of securities and to the 
evolution of a management structure in which the so-called 
owners play insignificant roles. The factor of limited liability 
has not been unimportant. It merely has not been paramount.1 
The same can be said for the evolution that has taken place 
within the business units using the corporate form. Recent 
years especially have seen an increasing use of the subsidiary- 
parent structure. The farthest point along this line of evolution 
has been reached in the public utility field. But other businesses 
have adopted it and used it extensively. The reasons for the 
use of this structure are manifold. The increased facility in 
financing; the desire to escape the difficulty, if not the impos- 
sibility, of qualifying the parent company as a foreign corpora- 
tion in a particular state; the avoidance of complications in- 
volved in the purchase of physical assets: the retention of the 
good will of an established business unit; the avoidance of taxa- 
tion; the avoidance of cumbersome management structures; the 
desire for limited liability, are among the primary motives.2 
The desire for limited liability has been merely one among many 
factors. And at times it has appeared to recede. 
Yet in spite of this apparent recession no one would claim that 
the availability of limited liability played an insignificant part 
in the expansion of industry and in the growth of trade and 
commerce. It has had a potent influence. Limited liability is 
now accepted in theory and in practice. It is ingrained in our 
economic and legal systems. The social and economic order is 
arranged accordingly. Our philosophy accepts it. It is legiti- 
* Parts I and II of this article were written by Mr. Douglas, and Part 
III by Mr. Shanks. 
1 See VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP (1923), especially c. V. 
2 See DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (1926) 763-783. 
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mate for a man or group of men to stake only a part of their 
fortune on an enterprise. Legislatures, courts and business 
usage have made it so. Each has taken the extreme but logical 
step of allowing one man to do what one thousand men may do. 
The use of dummy incorporators has received high judicial sanc- 
tion. There need be but one economic interest, as long as the 
substantive provisions of the statute are satisfied.3 To be sure 
the use of the word "person" in the statutes describing who may 
be incorporators permits the interpretation that a corporation 
does not fall within this category. And it has been so held.4 But 
the same result may be reached by dummy incorporators who 
after incorporation transfer their shares to the corporation.5 
And a usage, which is fast becoming inveterate, sanctions it. 
If there is no incorporation of a new business but merely the ac- 
quisition of an established one, in absence of legislative prohibi- 
tion the shares of such company may be acquired by another 
corporation so long as the acquisition comes within the scope of 
the purposes set forth in the charter of the latter. This rule is 
likewise well established.6 
The problem here is to ascertain the manner of organization 
and operation which is necessary in order to secure the insula- 
tion from liability which the organizers desired and which the 
legal system permits. Little will be gained by seeking to ascer- 
tain what a corporation is. It is not a thing. It is a method. 
It defies definition when removed from the background of the 
purpose attempted to be accomplished and the manner of accom- 
plishing it. When defined as a method the definition varies. The 
definition for one purpose may be totally different from the defi- 
nition for another. So the utility in a definition is lacking. In 
the approach there is no room for theorizing in respect to the 
3 Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N. Y. 254, 144 N. E. 519 (1924); Salomon 
v. Salomon & Co. Ltd., [1897] A. C. 22. See Louisville Banking Co. v. 
Eisenman, 94 Ky. 83, 21 S. W. 531 (1893). 
4 Factors' & Traders' Insurance Co. v. New Harbor Protection Co., 37 
La. Ann. 233 (1885); Denny Hotel Co. v. Schram, 6 Wash. 134, 32 Pac. 
1002 (1893); Nebraska Shirt Co. v. Horton, 3 Herd. 888, 93 N. W. 225 
(Neb. 1903). 
Kardo Co. v. Adams, 231 Fed. 950 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916). 
6 State v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 237 Mo. 338, 141 S. W. 643 (1911); Clark v. 
Memphis Street Ry., 123 Tenn. 236, 130 S. W. 751 (1910). For typical 
statutes see DEL. REV. CODE (1915) 948, ? 1991; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 
1924) art. 23, ? 9. For cases where the purchase or acquisition was held 
not to be within the charter powers or fairly incidental thereto, see People 
v. Pullman Car Co., 175 Ill. 125, 51 N. E. 664 (1898); Central Railroad 
Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582 (1869). 
The statute may create a prohibition. State v. Atlantic City and 
Shore R. R., 77 N. J. L. 465, 72 Atl. 111 (1909); Franklin Bk. v. Com- 
mercial Bk., 36 Ohio St. 350 (1881); ILL. GEN. CORP. ACT (1919) ? 8; MASS. 
GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 156, ? 5. 
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corporate entity.7 The sole concern need be only with the pur- 
pose and the means of attaining it. 
On analysis the problem resolves itself into one of allocation 
of losses. The issue is whether the loss resulting from a con- 
tract or tort claim against the subsidiary will be placed on it 
or on the parent. In the following discussion it is assumed that 
such a claim exists against the subsidiary. It is also assumed that 
the incorporation provisions of the statute have been fully com- 
plied with both by the parent and by the subsidiary. For analy- 
tical reasons the cases will be grouped according to whether the 
claim is tort or contract 
II. TORT 
The statement that the insulation will be broken down when 
the subsidiary is an "agency," "adjunct," "instrumentality," 
"alter ego," "tool," "corporate double," or "dummy" of the 
parent is not helpful. These concepts themselves need defining. 
At best they merely state results. And the results are significant 
only in light of the facts. The conclusion that the parent will 
be held liable only when the use of the subsidiary is a "cloak for 
fraud" or is "inequitable," "unjust," or "unconscionable" also 
falls short of describing the standard of conduct which the facts 
of most of the cases permit. The facts deal with the manner and 
method of organization and operation.8 It is with those facts 
7 For an extremely good statement of this viewpoint, see the language of 
Bijur, J., in Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 119, 
222 N. Y. Supp. 532, 543 (Sup. Ct. 1927). 
See also Dewey, .The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality 
(1926) 35 YALE L. J. 655; and (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 254. 
8 As said by Cardozo, J., in Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry., 244 N. Y. 84, 
94, 155 N. E. 58, 61 (1926): "The whole problem of the relation between 
parent and subsidiary corporations is one that is still enveloped in the 
mists of metaphor. Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for 
starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it. 
We say at times that the corporate entity will be ignored when the parent 
corporation operates a business through a subsidiary which is characterized 
as an 'alias' or a 'dummy.' All this is well enough if the picturesqueness 
of the epithets does not lead us to forget that the essential term to be 
defined is the act of operation." 
The following table listing the various types of organization and opera- 
tion will prove useful: 
1. Ownership of all of the stock of the subsidiary. 
2. Ownership of a majority of the stock of the subsidiary or the con- 
trolling interest therein. 
3. Ownership by the same persons of the stock of both corporations. 
4. Sufficiency or insufficiency of the capital of the subsidiary as measured 
by that employed in normal competitive units. 
5. Degree to which the subsidiary was financed by the parent. 
6. The method of such financing. 
7. The extent to which there was a common directorate. 
8. The extent to which there were common officers and employees. 
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that we are concerned. They vary and appear in many combina- 
tions. In order to ascertain the proper combinations which will 
assure the parent the desired insulation and to reveal those com- 
binations that have proved fatal to limited liability, an analysis 
of the many types of organizations is essential. 
Ownership of all or a majority of the stock of the subsidiary 
or a controlling interest therein or ownership by the same per- 
sons of all or a majority of the stock of both companies appears 
as a constant. In the discussion which follows it can be assumed 
that it is present. Otherwise the problem would normally not 
arise. It is well established that such ownership alone does not 
suffice to destroy the non-conductor of liability.9 It is tacit in 
that conclusion that the exercise of the "control" which stock 
ownership gives to the stockholders, either by statute, judicial 
decision, or normal corporation procedure, will not create liabil- 
ity beyond the assets of the subsidiary. That "control" includes 
the election of directors, the making of by-laws, increasing or 
decreasing the authorized capital stock, and the doing of all other 
acts incident to the legal status of stockholders. Nor will a du- 
plication of some 10 or all 11 of the directors or executive officers 
be fatal. The fact that the constitution and organization of the 
management of each are the same does not mean that the busi- 
ness identities of the two units are assimilated. 
The observance of the following four standards will keep the 
business units from being treated as assimilated: (1) A separate 
financial unit should be set up and maintained. That unit should 
be sufficiently financed so as to carry the normal strains upon it. 
9. The extent to which separate meetings of stockholders and directors 
were held. 
10. The extent to which both had common departments of business. 
11. The degree to which contracts between the two were favorable to 
one rather than the other. 
12. The extent to which separate books and accounts were kept. 
13. The extent to which an officer or director of one was permitted to 
determine the policies of the other. 
14. The extent to which an employee, officer, or director of the parent 
was causally connected with the tort or contract on which suit is brought. 
15. The type of business of each. 
16. The extent to which the trade or public generally regarded the two 
units as one business unit. 
17. Whom the contract claimant regarded as the promissor. 
18. The extent to which there were conveyances by the subsidiary to 
the parent in fraud of creditors of the former. 
Other factors will suggest themselves. Those listed will have to be 
broken down. But they will suffice as guide posts both for the tort and 
contract cases. 
9 Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry., supra note 8; Bergenthal v. State Garage 
& Trucking Co., 179 Wis. 42, 190 N. W. 901 (1922). 
10 Stone v. C. C. C. & St. L. Ry., 202 N. Y. 352, 95 N. E. 816 (1911); 
Pennsylvania R. R. v. Jones, 155 U. S. 333, 15 Sup. Ct. 136 (1894). 
11 Bergenthal v. State Garage & Trucking Co., supra note 9; Berkey 
v. Third Avenue Ry., supra note 8 (practical identity). 
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The risks attendant on the conduct of a business of that type 
can roughly be averaged and that average met. (2) The day to 
day business of the two units should be kept separate. Normally 
each process can be tagged so as to identify it with the activity 
of one unit or with that of the other. Occasionally such tagging 
will be difficult in a case where the two businesses are merely 
units in a line of production. But such separation as the tech- 
nology of the business permits should be sufficient. And in addi- 
tion the financial and business records of the two units should 
be separately kept. (3) The formal barriers between the two 
management structures should be maintained. The ritual of 
separate meetings should be religiously observed. The activities 
of the individuals serving on the two boards can be tagged so 
that the individuals qua directors of the subsidiary can always 
be distinguished from the same individuals qua directors of 
the parent. Such tagging is not pure fiction. It draws the line 
that keeps the dual capacities separate and distinct. It conforms 
to the habit of thought which accepts the fact of dual capacity 
but which demands a separation of conduct so that each act may 
be clearly categorized. Separate meetings of the boards are 
sufficient. The same problem arises in connection with the 
officers. And the same solution suggests itself. A man may 
not be indiscriminately one officer or another. The observance 
of the niceties of business efficiency are normally sufficient. 
Such demands are not exacting. They merely suffice to keep 
the record of the business affairs of the two units from becom- 
ing hopelessly intermingled. (4) The two units should not 
be represented as being one unit. Those with whom they come 
in contact should be kept sufficiently informed of their separate 
identities. 
Conformity with the above standards is all that normally could 
be required of two units so closely connected. With exceptions 
to be noted, it will generally suffice to set up the desired non- 
conductor of liability. The cases sustain the position. 
In Bergenthal v. State Garage & Trucking Co.," so far as ap- 
pears the subsidiary was sufficiently financed, its organization 
was separately maintained, and its business records and affairs 
distinctly segregated. The plaintiff, a passenger in a taxicab 
owned by the subsidiary and operated by a driver employed by 
an officer of the subsidiary, was injured by the negligence of the 
operator. It appeared that the subsidiary and parent occupied 
the same offices and had the same telephone; that the parent was 
engaged in the automobile livery business under the name of 
"Boynton Automobile Livery Co."; that the name "Boynton's" 
was printed on the side of the taxicabs of the subsidiary; that 
the plaintiff secured a cab by directing a friend of his to call the 
12 Supra note 9. 
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common telephone number. A judgment for the plaintiff against 
the parent was reversed. The court found that no reliance had 
been placed by the plaintiff on the parent's apparent ownership 
or control of the particular cab. That factor being removed and, 
so far as appears, no actual assimilation of business units hav- 
ing been effected, the decision seems sound. 
The same can be said for the cases of Berkey v. Third Avenue 
Ry.13 and Stone v. C. C. C. & St. L. Ry.'4 Both involved the oper- 
ation of railroad "systems," part by the parent and part by the 
subsidiary. In each the lines were advertised as a "system." 
But obviously this alone is not sufficient to constitute apparent 
assimilation, on which the plaintiff would reasonably rely. And 
those cases reveal no additional facts indicating such reliance. 
In the Berkey case the plaintiff, a passenger on a street car, was 
injured by the negligence of the motorman. The franchise to 
operate that line was in the subsidiary. The parent bought the 
cars and leased them to the subsidiary at a daily rental, which 
was paid. The cars so leased and the crews operating them did 
not serve beyond the line of the subsidiary. There were com- 
mon officers and directors, with some slight variation. The offi- 
cers were paid by checks of the parent. The common claim 
and accounting departments were similarly paid. Motormen and 
conductors of the subsidiary were paid by the parent. There was 
a common paymaster and one general manager for the entire 
system who had charge of the superintendents of operation who 
in turn supervised the motormen and conductors. There was a 
common repair and construction department. The parent con- 
tracted and paid for the electricity to be used in the entire 
system and paid other bills for general and miscellaneous ex- 
penses, apparently allocating to the subsidiary portions of these 
items. The same was true of expenses for maintenance and re- 
pair and judgments for personal injuries, although in some cases 
the subsidiary paid in the first instance. From time to time the 
parent made loans to the subsidiary for construction and also 
for operating expenses. The construction loans were represented 
by a demand note and second mortgage bonds. Operating loans 
were generally repaid the following month and not later than the 
following year. The charges were more than mere book entries, 
as they were repaid by drafts drawn upon the subsidiary and re- 
paid with its own money. The subsidiary was solvent. 
The detail of the Berkey case forbids further repetition here. 
But in summary it seems clear that the subsidiary was ade- 
quately financed and solvent; that the rituals of the separate 
management structures had been observed; that the details of 
13 Supra note 8. 
14 Supra note 10. 
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the day to day business of transportation were handled by two 
distinct personnels, except insofar as economy and efficiency in 
operation had persuaded duplication at strategic points. In 
other words, assimilation had not been reached. There was a 
dissent. The majority placed considerable emphasis on the fact 
that the plaintiff's argument would require the assumption of the 
existence of a contract between the subsidiary and parent 
whereby the parent was to use and operate the former's fran- 
chise as its own. Such contract would violate the Public Service 
Commissions Law and constitute a crime. Hence, the majority 
felt reluctant to infer such an agreement "from conduct or cir- 
cumstances so indefinite and equivocal." But it does not seem 
that the holding needs that additional argument for support. It 
can be maintained on the grounds indicated. 
In the Stone case the action was for damages for property 
negligently injured in transit. The goods were received for 
shipment by the subsidiary. No part of the road of the parent 
was within the shipping route. The only other connecting links 
between the parent and the injury were the facts that the parent 
owned a majority of the stock of the subsidiary; that a minority 
of the directors of the subsidiary were directors of the parent; 
that several executive officers of the subsidiary held corre- 
sponding or other offices in the parent; that such officers at some 
points had offices in the same building and in one case in the same 
suite of rooms as the officers of the parent. Obviously these facts 
were not sufficient to maintain the action even without the addi- 
tional facts that the subsidiary made its own contracts, kept its 
own accounts, collected its own revenues, and paid its own oper- 
ating expenses, and that the only financial interest of the parent 
was by way of dividends on its stock. 
The same result has also been reached in Friedman v. Vandalia 
R. R.15 A number of railroads organized a corporation for ter- 
minal purposes. A separate management was constituted for the 
subsidiary. So far as appears that management functioned 
separately and independently. The only direct interference was 
a potential one which apparently was never exercised. It 
was the right of any of the railway companies to cause subordi- 
nate officers and employees of the subsidiary to be removed for 
cause. Such potential interference was so minor and insignifi- 
cant when translated into direct control over the policies of the 
subsidiary as not to amount to an assimilation of the two busi- 
ness units. 
These cases suggest others for contrast. In Costan v. Manila 
15 254 Fed. 292 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916). Other cases of the same type are 
Pennsylvania R. R. v. Jones, supra note 10; Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. v. 
Cochran, 43 Kan. 225, 23 Pac. 151 (1890). 
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Electric Co.16 the parent was held liable for a tort committed as 
an incident of the subsidiary's business. The separate manage- 
ment structure of the subsidiary had been disregarded. The di- 
rectors of the parent had appointed a committee and authorized 
it to enter into an agreement with a manager to supervise the 
management and operation of the properties of the parent and 
subsidiary. A contract between the manager and the parent was 
accordingly executed, giving such manager extensive powers over 
the properties of the parent and subsidiary, which would result 
in making the business of the subsidiary almost completely sub- 
jected to the control of such manager. The subsidiary did not 
take part in the consummation of this plan. The only part which 
the subsidiary apparently played was to undertake to pay part 
of the manager's salary. And from what appears it seems that 
that obligation was saddled upon the subsidiary by the direct 
action of the parent. The management contract gave to the 
parent the sole right to supervise the actions of the manager. 
This contract was carried out and operation under it commenced. 
During that time the plaintiff's personal injury claim accrued 
against the subsidiary. The court allowed a recovery against 
the parent. Swan, J., said, 
. . . the holding company utterly disregards the Manila Elec- 
tric Company as a distinct corporate entity, except perhaps for 
bookkeeping purposes, and deals with the properties and their 
operation as a street railway exactly as though the legal title 
were in the holding company." 17 
In other words, the blending of management structures and of 
the two operation processes was fatal. Assimilation for man- 
agement purposes was complete. The parent which treats the 
subsidiary as in no way different from its own property (so far 
as management and operation are concerned) is allowed to ac- 
quire it with the burdensome as well as the beneficial incidents 
of ownership attached. Cases conforming to this pattern inva- 
riably go the same way. 
In the case of The William Van Driel,l8 the parent (technically 
the lessee of the parent under a 999 year lease) and the subsidi- 
ary held separate director and stockholder meetings regularly. 
The accounts of the subsidiary were in charge of employees and 
officers of the parent. They were likewise paid by the parent. 
The court found that the surplus the subsidiary had in the bank 
was under the absolute, direct control of the parent. At one time 
a large fraction of the surplus was voted by the subsidiary at the 
request of the parent for a certain purpose. Further, the parent 
16 24 F. (2d) 383 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928). 
17 Ibid, 384. 
s8 The William Van Driel, Sr., 252 Fed. 35 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918). 
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through its officers issued orders from time to time as to the 
charges and other features of the management of the subsidiary. 
The salary of the superintendent of the subsidiary was increased 
by the order of a vice-president of the parent. The claim was for 
injuries due to the negligence of an employee of the subsidiary. 
A decree for the parent was reversed. The court ruled that the 
parent was liable even though in many respects the subsidiary 
had a separate business existence. It had a superintendent who 
directed the mechanical operations. Aside from the mechanical 
phases of the business it seemed quite clear that the parent was 
in control directly. Complete dominion over the treasury was 
present. And on policy questions the parent apparently dictated. 
Judging from the past, it could and it did. Except for the me- 
chanical operations it had made the business its own. Such 
adoption should carry burdens with it as well as benefits. 
In Auglaize Box Board Co. v. Hinton,'9 the subsidiary was 
insolvent. The parent took over the operation of the factory. 
Ostensibly it was operated as a separate concern and in the name 
of the subsidiary. After the parent took over the operation no 
officer or agent of the subsidiary did any act by way of domina- 
tion or control over the business of the subsidiary. In other 
words, the management of the subsidiary became a nonentity. 
During such period an employee of the subsidiary was injured. 
The parent was held responsible, though it had taken out liability 
insurance in the name of the subsidiary and paid the premium 
out of its own funds. Few cases present such a clear case of com- 
plete domination. 
In Joseph R. Foard Co. v. State,20 the subsidiary was organized 
to handle the stevedore business of the parent, a shipbroker and 
agent. The authorized capital of the subsidiary was $2000, all of 
which was paid in cash by the parent through dummy incorpora- 
tors. These incorporators were also the directors and officers. 
On organization the parent sold the subsidiary equipment for 
$1,450. The stevedores and superintendent were employees of 
the subsidiary. Since shortly after its organization, no stock- 
holders' or directors' meetings of the subsidiary were held. The 
subsidiary never handled its own current funds. These were 
handled by the parent and deposited in the parent's account. The 
subsidiary never paid its officers any salary. The parent took 
the greater part of all the profits as compensation for managing 
the subsidiary. All bills of the subsidiary were paid by the 
parent. The books of the parent were with few exceptions the 
same as they would have been had the subsidiary been a mere 
department of its business. The parent could not take a trial 
balance without including the balances of the accounts of the sub- 
19 100 Ohio St. 505, 126 N. E. 881 (1919). 
20 219 Fed. 827 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914). 
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sidiary. Whenever the subsidiary suffered a net loss it was 
carried into the profit and loss account of the parent. In such 
case the subsidiary was not treated as a debtor of the parent. 
The loss was treated as the parent's. In negotiating business 
there was evidence that the parent dealt directly with the busi- 
ness of the subsidiary without working through the management 
structure of the subsidiary. In the words of the lower court, 
the officers "never thought, and in the nature of things never 
could think, in what capacity they were acting at any particular 
time, whether as the officer of one company or that of the other." 
In result there was but one management-that of the parent. 
That of the subsidiary was non-existent for all practical pur- 
poses. Scrambling of two business units rarely has been so com- 
plete. 
Whether separate, independent management structures have 
been maintained is often difficult to determine.21 In Oriental In- 
vesting Co. v. Barclay,22 the subsidiary was organized as an oper- 
ating company to manage a hotel property of the parent com- 
pany (the same individuals owned the stock of both companies). 
It appeared that only four directors' meetings of the subsidiary 
were held in a period of several years, but an executive of the 
subsidiary was in charge of its business; and at times the 
parent company furnished supplies to the hotel and received 
directly the payment which was due the subsidiary under a con- 
tract. From these facts alone it would be difficult to say that 
there had been the necessary assimilation to entail liability. But 
even though there was not an assimilation the decision can be 
sustained. In the first place the existence of the subsidiary was 
quite generally unknown. It was unknown to the plaintiffs, who 
were employees in the hotel and were injured by a falling eleva- 
tor. So far as they were concerned their employer was the domi- 
nant company, who had hired them before the operating company 
was organized. Under such facts a different employer should 
not be substituted. The cases giving rights against ostensible 
inviters are forceful analogies.2 In addition the subsidiary 
seems not to have been sufficiently financed. It never had a dol- 
lar of paid-up capital, except $2000 which the dominant company 
sent to pay for 20% of a stock subscription. The balance of the 
21 A number of cases present so few facts as to be valuable only as 
interesting examples of legal literature and not as cases where from the 
facts any analysis is possible. A few of such cases are Finnish Temperance 
Soc. v. Finnish Socialistic Pub. Co., 238 Mass. 345, 130 N. E. 845 (1921); 
Pennsylvania Co. v. Rossett, 116 11. App. 342 (1904) (a few skeletonized 
facts pointing to direct interference do appear, however); Davis v. Alex- 
ander, 269 U. S. 114, 46 Sup. Ct. 34 (1925). 
22 64 S. W. 80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901). 
23Jewison v. Dieudonne, 127 Minn. 163, 149 N. W. 20 (1914). But cf. 
Meehan v. Hesselgrave, 121 Wash. 568, 210 Pac. 2 (1922). 
202 [Vol. 39 
SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 
subscription was never paid. Such financing obviously did not 
suffice for such a property. The costs and risks of operation were 
out of all proportion to it. The monthly rental alone was $1500. 
In addition the property had to be kept in repair and all taxes 
and insurance paid by the subsidiary. In fact, at the time of 
the trial the subsidiary was heavily indebted to the dominant 
company, with apparently no assets with which to pay. The 
cases of inadequate financing are rare. The factor appeared in 
the Joseph R. Foard Co. case but did not become so crucial, as 
other facts were quite decisive of the case. But there again the 
financial structure seemed wholly inadequate to meet the normal 
strains and stresses of business. $2000 authorized capital with 
the parent milking the subsidiary of all profits! Those coming 
into contact with such business units would have little protection. 
Those organizing such units should furnish substantial financial 
protection-as measured by the risks to the normal competitive 
unit-for those who will do business or come into contact with 
the unit, before the privilege of limited liability is extended to 
the parent. Independently of the other grounds for the decisions, 
the Joseph R. Foard Co. case and the Barclay case might well be 
decided as they were because of the inadequate financial struc- 
tures. 
But perhaps the most interesting of the entire group of cases 
is Erickson v. Minnesota & Ontario Power Co.4 The action was 
for damage to land which was inundated as a result of the 
negligent operation of a dam. The parent owned the land. The 
subsidiary acquired the right to erect the dam. The parent con- 
tracted with the subsidiary whereby the latter was to erect the 
dam and perpetually maintain it. The parent advanced the 
entire cost of the dam in the form of an interest bearing loan 
secured by a mortgage which covered all property of the sub- 
sidiary of every name and nature. By the contract the parent 
agreed to pay $4,000 annually to meet the expense of the 
dam. By the contract the parent also reserved the exclusive 
right to the use of the water passing over the dam and of the 
land and power houses and reserved the right to place, set, use, 
and control all the machinery and appliances connected with 
the operation of the dam. No rent was paid for this use and the 
subsidiary received no revenue from it. The parent owned and 
operated mills and used all the power generated. A judgment 
dismissing the action was reversed and a new trial granted. The 
decision can be supported on two grounds. In the first place, the 
type of financing alone should be fatal to the insulation from 
liability. Regardless of what the initial financial structure of 
the subsidiary was, when the parent subsequently took a mort- 
gage covering all of the property of the subsidiary; when it was 
24134 Minn. 209, 158 N. W. 979 (1916). 
1929] 203 
YALE LAW JOURNAL 
impossible under the operating contract for the subsidiary to 
derive any revenue from its business (the operation of a dam); 
and when the parent by the one-sided contract which was drawn 
was milking the subsidiary dry and returning to it nothing ex- 
cept maintenance for the dam, the subsidiary had become finan- 
cially sterile. The protection necessary for those in the plaintiff's 
position was lacking. The strains incident to such opera- 
tion could not be carried by such a frail structure. This does 
not mean that a parent company may not finance a subsidiary. 
It is often done and limited liability is retained.25 But the type 
of financing under all the facts must be fair to the business unit 
financed. On that ground alone the decision could be sustained. 
But there is another. By the terms of the operating contract the 
right of direct interference in the operation of the dam was re- 
served to the parent. It had potential control-not indirect con- 
trol through the cumbersome mechanism of the two management 
structures-but direct control over the machinery of the dam. 
Since that right existed; since by virtue of it the parent stood 
in a strategic position to operate the dam so as to prevent such 
injuries as occurred, it seems reasonable to attach a duty to the 
right. Direct interference having been contracted for, a higher 
standard of conduct should be imposed. This ground alone is 
support for the case. Certainly these two grounds are more 
meaningful than the vague statement of the court that the sub- 
sidiary is a "mere agency" of the parent. "Agency" states a 
result and only a result. It does not help the mind in the process 
of dissection and analysis necessary for a clearer understanding 
of the cases. 
There are cases which present many of the features of the 
foregoing ones but which analytically are quite different. They 
raise the question whether or not the parent is, for purpose of 
jurisdiction, doing business within a state when it has a sub- 
sidiary operating in that state.26 The queston is purely a juris- 
dictional one. It hinges on the application of the "presence" 
test.27 It is divorced from the many and varied issues involved 
25 Owl Fumigating Corp. v. California Cyanide Co. Inc., 24 F. (2d) 718 
(D. Del. 1928), aff'd, 30 F. (2d) 812 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929); Berkey v. Third 
Avenue Ry., supra note 8. 
26 Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U. S. 333, 45 Sup. Ct. 
250 (1925); P. & N. T. Ry. v. Cox, 106 Tex. 74, 157 S. W. 745 (1913); 
Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. v. Stevens, 109 Tex. 262, 206 S. W. 921 
(1918), overruling Buie v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 95 Tex. 51, 65 S. W. 
27 (1901), and following Peterson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 205 U. S. 
364, 27 Sup. Ct. 513 (1906); Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 
406, 23 Sup. Ct. 728 (1902); Cutler v. Cutler-Hammer Mfg. Co., 266 Fed. 
388 (D. Mass. 1920). 
27 Cahill, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations (1917) 30 HARv. L. 
REV. 676; Scott, Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents Doing Business Within 
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in the analysis of the liability cases. As stated by Brandeis, J., 
with respect to this question of jurisdiction, "There is here no at- 
tempt to hold the defendant liable for an act or omission of its 
subsidiary or to enforce as against the latter a liability of the 
defendant. Hence, cases concerning substantive rights . . . 
have no application." 28 In view of this dissimilarity they are 
dismissed from this discussion without more ado. 
There is a group of cases where liability is imposed upon the 
parent for torts of the subsidiary, even though the four stand- 
ards of organization and operation which have been discussed 
above are in most instances met. Lehigh Valley Ry. v. Dupont 29 
is one. The negligence was the maintenance of a dangerous 
station platform on which the deceased, a passenger, was stand- 
ing when he was hit by a passing train. The ticket, good for 
transportation to a point on the line of the subsidiary, had been 
purchased by the deceased from the defendant's ticket agent. On 
its face it did not purport to be the contract of the subsidiary 
nor did it refer to the subsidiary in any way. It purported to 
be an undertaking of the defendant. That undertaking should 
be sufficient to entail liability. A relationship of passenger and 
carrier existed. As a consequence, the incidents of that relation- 
ship would follow. The defendant could not relieve itself of 
those incidents by delegating to another-the subsidiary-the 
performance of the contract. If through the negligence of the 
subsidiary the deceased was injured, the parent should be held. 
The case is totally different from the situation where the parent 
acts as a mere selling agent for the subsidiary and sells tickets in 
the name of the subsidiary good over the lines of the latter. This 
analysis puts the case on a more rational basis than the secondary 
reason of the court that the parent should be liable because "the 
dominant corporation ultimately derives all the profits and incurs 
all the losses arising from the traffic originating on any of the 
lines." 30 The profit and loss earmarks can be found in every 
parent company. 
There is a closely related type of case in which the parent 
company is held liable. In Wichita, F. & N. W. Ry. v. Puckett,31 
the injured plaintiff had been employed by a common superin- 
tendent. He was injured as a result of a defective engine, which 
engine it was the duty of a common master mechanic to overhaul. 
Said mechanic was probably negligent. In addition the engines 
a State (1919) 32 HARV. L. REV. 871; Ballantine, Separate Entity of 
Parent and Subsidiary Corporations (1925) 14 CALIF. L. REv. 12; (1925) 
20 ILL. L. REV. 281. 
28 Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., supra note 26, at 337, 45 
Sup. Ct. at 251. 
29128 Fed. 840 (C. C. A: 2d, 1904). 
30 Ibid. 846. 
31 53 Okla. 463, 157 Pac. 112 (1915). 
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were used interchangeably between the two connecting lines, 
though the engine in question was not the property of the parent. 
Not only was the common employee negligent but the activity out 
of which the negligence arose was not clearly identified as the 
parent's or subsidiary's, as the engine would or might be used 
interchangeably in the business of each. Being not clearly 
identified with the business of one, it should properly be tagged 
as the activity of either. If the particular process or activity 
could not be tagged by the parties as belonging to one or the 
other, it was quite properly the process or activity of each. The 
courts should not be expected to do what the parties themselves 
could not do. If the process or activity could have been tagged 
by the parties but was not, there seems no compelling reason why 
the courts should do the tagging ex post facto for them. Such 
result seems not unduly burdensome. If it is worth the price to 
intermingle the processes, the parties will. If it is not, they 
normally can separate them. The same confusion did not exist 
in the Berkey case. While at certain points the business activ- 
ities of the two companies were merged, c. g., in the repair shops, 
the business being done at the time of plaintiff's injury was 
clearly tagged. It was that of the subsidiary. 
The confusion in deterrmining whose business is being done at 
the time of the injury may arise in another way. In Lehigh 
Valley R. R. v. Delachesa,32 the cars and engine of the defendant 
were on the track and dock of the subsidiary. The tnen in charge 
of the dock and the train had been employed by the subsidiary. 
The iron being unloaded at the time of the injury was being de- 
livered from the cars in which it was originally received by 
defendant on its own line. The bill of lading covering the goods 
in question did not appear. The plaintiff was an employee of a 
firm of stevedores unloading a car and was injured by the neg- 
ligence of the men in charge of the dock and train. The trial 
court instructed the jury that the parent company was not liable 
to the plaintiff unless they found that it was engaged in deliver- 
ing the iron at the dock. The appellate court affirmed a judg- 
ment for plaintiff. On that theory the decision can be sup- 
ported. Certainly if the parent undertook to deliver the iron 
at the dock and did not allocate that undertaking to the sub- 
sidiary, the parent is liable, even though the employees were 
hired, paid and subject to discharge by the subsidiary. That 
which it undertakes to do is its business. It may very well do its 
business with another's employees. But the risks attendant on 
the doing of that business are not avoided. This is quite con- 
sistent with agency law.33 Thus the case can be reconciled with 
32145 Fed. 617 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906). 
33 Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (1929) 38 YALz 
L. J. 584. Note also Werner v. Hearst, 177 N. Y. 63, 69 N. E. 221 (1903), 
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the Dupont case. But it can hardly find support in the state- 
ment of the court: "The question was not one of practical im- 
portance to the defendant, but merely whether it should be 
called upon to pay out of one or another of its several purses." 34 
Such reasoning would lead to the removal of insulation in any 
case of a wholly owned subsidiary. Limited liability in such case 
would become sheer fiction. 
There is also a group of cases where the alleged wrong can 
seemingly be traced to the parent through the conduit of its 
own personnel and management. Thus in Specht v. Mo. Pac. R. 
R.,35 the plaintiff was injured while inspecting cars. The injury 
appeared to have been caused by the use of a defective coupler. 
The parent owned the rolling stock in question. Though the 
possession of the car was, according to the operating contract in 
force between the two companies, in the subsidiary at the time of 
the injury, the existence of the defective coupler presumably 
could be directly traced to the parent. The management which 
chose the type of coupler was the parent's. That management 
reserved the ownership of the rolling stock. Ownership normally 
infers control. And in absence of evidence that the control in- 
cident to ownership had been transferred to the subsidiary the 
presumption would be that the owner controlled the car in ques- 
tion in the sense of having supervision over its mechanical fit- 
ness, which would include the condition of the couplers. The fact 
that the operating contract between parent and subsidiary stated 
that, when the rolling stock came on to the lines of the subsidiary, 
possession of every unit would pass to it and each unit would be- 
come the unit of the subsidiary, would not demolish the pre- 
sumption. To do so the incidents of that possession and the 
history of the defective coupler would have to be known. Super- 
vision over mechanical fitness may not have been allocated to the 
subsidiary when it took possession; and even if it had been so 
allocated, perhaps the parent was also causally connected with 
the condition of the coupler. These facts are not stated in the 
case. Further support for the case is found in the fact that the 
action was founded on the Federal Safety Appliance Act.36 The 
court, though not making an analysis of that act, concludes that 
it places responsibility on the "owner." It said, ". . . the de- 
where the issue was whether the person who was negligent was the em- 
ployee of the corporation or of a stockholder of the corporation. 4 Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Delachesa, supra note 32, at 619. 
5 154 Minn. 314, 191 N. W. 905 (1923). 
36 The original act (27 STAT. 531 (1893), as amended by 29 STAT. 85 
(1896)) provided ". . . it shall be unlawful for any such common carrier 
to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car used in moving 
interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by im- 
pact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going 
between the ends of the cars." 
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fendant owned all the rolling stock used by the Delaware corpo- 
ration, and plaintiff's injury arose out of a defective coupler used 
in violation of the Safety Appliance Act, on a car which was 
owned by this defendant." 3 Such interpretation of the act 
seems reasonable and consistent with the presumption of control 
set forth above. The decision certainly cannot be reconciled 
with the great weight of authority if it is explained in the fol- 
lowing language of the court: "The'potential and ultimate con- 
trol' is exercised by defendant as completely and directly as the 
machinery of corporate organisms permit."" Such rule would 
remove the insulation from liability between every subsidiary 
and parent. 39 
The case where the parent is negligent suggests other instances 
where the parent is directly a participant in the wrong com- 
plained of. The parent has been held liable in a tort action for 
inducing the subsidiary by means of its stock ownership to 
breach a contract with the plaintiff.40 Stock ownership was not 
37 Specht v. Mo. Pac. R. R., supra note 35, at 320, 191 N. W. at 907. 38 Ibid. 321, 191 N. W. at 907. 
s9 In Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 141 Md. 67, 
118 Atl. 279 (1922), the parent was sued for the negligence of the wholly 
owned subsidiary. The deceased was injured by the negligent operation 
of a train of the subsidiary. The trial court had charged that if they 
found those operating the train were subject to the control of the parent, 
the latter would be liable. Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed. The 
court said that such instruction "might have easily led them (the jury) 
to believe that there could be a recovery if the steel company had control 
of the railroad company as owner of the stock. . . . That is going beyond 
what the authorities justify." Ibid. 78, 118 Atl. at 282. 
4n Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. v. Cities Service Co., 281 Fed. 214 (D. Del. 1922). 
A variation of the facts of the preceding case appears in Ufa Eastern 
Division Distribution, Inc. v. Universum Film Aktiengesellschaft, recently 
decided by Special Term of the New York Supreme Court (not yet re- 
ported). There the parent was sued in tort on allegations that officers of 
the parent had induced the subsidiary to breach a contract with the 
plaintiff. The defendant moved to vacate certain attachments on the 
grounds that the defendant was to be regarded as a party to the contract 
and was therefore liable, in contract and not in tort. The motion was 
denied. The court said: 
"While the American corporation with which plaintiff contracted was a 
medium by which the defendant by stock ownership controlled the business 
of such American corporation in making of its contract with plaintiff, it 
did not exercise a power conferred upon it by the defendant, but a power 
inherent in it as a corporate entity. It did not in a legal sense derive its 
right to make the contract from the defendant. It was, therefore, not in 
a legal sense the defendant's agent in the making of the contract." 
From the above discussion it is evident that mere stock ownership is 
not enough to constitute the parent "agent" of the subsidiary. But if 
the two businesses were completely assimilated, the fact of the agency 
would be established, and the dominant company which had made the busi- 
ness of the subsidiary its own should not be liable in tort. The contract, 
though not in its name, would be the contract of the parent in the sense 
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enough. But the use of the latent power incident to stock owner- 
ship to accomplish a specific result made the parent a partic- 
ipator in or the doer of the act. Again, there was interference 
in the internal management of the subsidiary; an overriding of 
the discretion of the managers of the subsidiary. The con- 
nection between the injury and the interference was so intimate 
as to make the resulting liability direct and not vicarious. It 
would seem reasonable to hold the parent liable in tort in any 
such case so long as it is not a party to the contract nor liable 
on it as an unnamed or undisclosed principal. 
The so-called fraud cases are similar. Another corporation 
cannot be set up to operate property under a lease to the parent 
so as to avoid payment by the parent of the royalties under the 
lease.4 The parent by direct acts of participation may be liable 
for the infringement of a patent though the infringement was 
apparently the act of the subsidiary. Thus, in Union Sulphur Co. 
v. Freeport Texas Co.,4 the parent was held liable where it knew 
of the infringing acts and did not repudiate them and where it 
employed engineers and constructors to furnish and construct 
the plants in which the acts of infringement were committed by 
the subsidiary, knowing that those premises would be used in a 
production process which would violate the plaintiff's patent. As 
stated by the court, "Under these circumstances the question of 
technical control by the defendant of the Freeport Sulphur Com- 
pany . . . becomes unimportant, as the infringing acts were in 
contemplation of law committed by the defendant." 43 
Similarly, in Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co. v. Radio-Craft 
Co.,44 before the subsidiary became affiliated with the parent it 
that it pertained to its business. In such case the parent could properly 
be called an unnamed or undisclosed principal. It is not clear in this case 
whether or not assimilation had been reached. Furthermore, the case 
may be somewhat weakened by the fact that no issue of ultimate liability 
was present, but only a question of the availability of a provisional remedy. 
41 Higgins v. California P. & A. Co., 147 Cal. 363, 81 Pac. 1070 (1905). 
Here substantially all the stock of all the companies was held by one man. 
Cf. Linn & Lane Lbr. Co. v. United States, 236 U. S. 574, 35 Sup. Ct. 
440 (1914), where voidable patents were not allowed to become valid by 
a transfer to a corporation formed for that purpose, though suit was not 
started against the company until the statute of limitations had run against 
the patentee. Suit had, however, been begun against the latter before the 
statute had run. 
42251 Fed. 634 (D. Del. 1918). 
43 Ibid. 662. 
44 291 Fed. 169 (D. N. J. 1923), aff'd, 7 F. (2d) 432 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925). 
The same result was reached in Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. 
Allis-Chalmers Co., 176 Fed. 362 (C. C. A. 3d, 1910). The facts in the 
latter case are not set forth in detail. The court says at 368: "It is enough 
for the present purpose to note that on the face of the pleadings the power 
to control, operate, and manufacture is in the Allis-Chalmers Company and 
is being exercised by that company." Cf. Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply 
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owned a non-transferable license to manufacture and sell. The 
defendant-parent company had actual notice of the limited char- 
acter of the license at the time the subsidiary was acquired. At 
that time the subsidiary had abandoned its business. It does not 
appear whether the formalities of separate legal organizations 
were respected or not, although the subsidiary was duly incorpo- 
rated. On the business side the court found there was complete 
assimilation. The subsidiary moved into the plant of the parent 
where the two units operated. Employees of the subsidiary 
worked at benches designated as benches of the subsidiary. 
Though separate corporate books were kept, business books of 
the subsidiary were not kept. The marketing plan was for the 
parent to sell the product under the name of the subsidiary. In 
all details of production and marketing the management struc- 
ture of the subsidiary seemed not to exist. The court said, 
"There is no difference between what the DeForest Company is 
doing and what it would have done had the license been trans- 
ferred." 45 Such direct interference was a clear case of infringe- 
ment by active participation. Again no question of vicarious 
liability was involved. The liability of a participator was at 
issue. 
This short survey indicates that there is no one formula which 
can be successfully applied to the tort cases. The formula varies 
with the facts of each case. But that is unimportant. The 
significance of this examination is that the concepts which the 
courts are using can be broken down and translated into the 
varying factual combinations which are found. That transla- 
tion will not give the answer to the problem at issue. But it 
will serve to pose the problem in language which seems more 
understandable. It will result in reducing the cases to a lower 
common denominator. It will make more intelligible, and per- 
haps more intelligent, the answer to the question, was the sub- 
sidiary an "agent" of the parent? 
III. CONTRACT 
The attempt to hold a parent corporation where the claim 
asserted is of contractual origin presents added difficulties. 
Co., 244 U. S. 294, 37 Sup. Ct. 506 (1917). 
In Owl Fumigating Corp. v. California Cyanide Co. Inc., supra note 25, 
judgment for the parent was given in an infringement case where it ap- 
peared, inter alia, that the parent did not organize the subsidiary to in- 
fringe the plaintiff's patent; that it was not impossible to carry out the 
purpose of the parent in organizing the subsidiary without infringing the 
patent; that separate and independent management structures were main- 
tained and operated. 
45 Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co. v. Radio-Craft Co., supra note 44, at 
174. 
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The very reasonable question must be met and answered why one 
who contracted with the subsidiary and received the promise 
which he bargained for but who has been disappointed in the ful- 
fillment by the subsidiary of its commitment should then be 
allowed to look to the parent." As a matter of contract right 
it is evident he may not. Additional compelling facts must 
appear. 
As in the case of tort claimants, without the primary requisite 
of practically complete ownership of the capital stock of the sub- 
sidiary by the parent or the common holding of substantially the 
entire capital stock of both, there is no room for discussion.47 
Such ownership, however, is not enough of itself to justify hold- 
ing the parent, and something in addition to or in variance from 
the normal control of the subsidiary through the medium of the 
ownership of its stock must be present.48 If any basis of pre- 
diction may be reached it must be through an analysis of the 
facts constituting the variants from such normal control. 
Certain cases in which liability of the parent for claims against 
its subsidiary is discussed may be dismissed with brief comment. 
The facts are such that either the decision may be placed upon 
well established grounds other than those involving a disregard 
of the corporate entities or the holding is greatly weakened so 
far as it tends to help in building up a theory for prediction. 
This class of cases includes those in which the claimant has acted 
to his detriment upon assertions and assurances made by officers 
of the parent as to ownership and control of the subsidiary and 
payment of its debts.49 Cases involving a transfer of assets 
of the subsidiary in fraud of its creditors are more numerous 
and need no aider by way of disregard of the corporate status to 
enable the aggrieved claimant to recover out of the assets trans- 
ferred,50 although they at times contain considerable language 
6 New York Trust Co. v. Corporate, 250 Fed. 668 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918); 
Marsch v. Southern New Eng. R. R., 230 Mass. 483, 120 N. E. 120 (1918); 
cf. C. Crane & Co. v. Frey, 126 Fed. 278 (C. C. A. 4th, 1903). 47 Phosphate Mining Co. v. Unione Austriaca Di Navigazione, 3 F. (2d) 
239 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924). 
48 Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, 21 F. (2d) 720 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); 
City of Holland v. Holland City Gas Co., 257 Fed. 679 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919); 
Allen v. Philadelphia Co., 265 Fed. 817 (C. C. A. 3d, 1920); Martin v. 
Development Co. of America, 240 Fed. 42 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917); Exchange 
Bank v. Macon Co., 97 Ga. 1, 25 S. E. 326 (1895); Hooper-Mankin Co. 
v. Matthew Addy Co., 4 F. (2d) 187 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925); cf. Chicago 
Mill & Lumber Co. v. Boatmen's Bank, 234 Fed. 41 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916). 
9 Platt v. Bradner Co., 131 Wash. 573, 230 Pac. 633 (1924); cf. Stark 
Electric R. R. v. McGinty Contracting Co., 238 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 6th, 
1917). 
50 Baltimore & O. Tel. Co. v. Interstate Tel. Co., 54 Fed. 50 (C. C. A. 
4th, 1893); Pennsylvania Canal Co. v. Brown, 235 Fed. 669 (C. C. A. 
3d, 1916). 
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about such a disregard. In many instances it is possible to spell 
out a direct contractual relationship between the parent and the 
creditor or to settle the matter by construction of the wording 
of the contract, thus obviating consideration of the question as 
to looking through the legal entity of either company; again 
corporations are ofttimes set up to accomplish a fraudulent end 
or to escape a specific contractual liability of some sort,6' or to 
avoid the provisions of a statute.6' In these, as well as in the 
case where a criminal prosecution is involved,4 there is often a 
direct disregard of the legal corporate status of the companies 
concerned, but the controlling social policy or the sanction of 
the statute implicated is so strong that the cases offer little help 
toward the formulation of a theory upon which to base predic- 
tion with respect to the question we are considering. An 
analysis, however, of cases not containing such disabilities does 
bring out a few guide posts, somewhat indefinite though they 
may be. 
It appeared in Portsmouth Cotton Oil Mfg. Corp. v. Fourth 
Natima Bank 55 that the defendant bank, in order to protect it- 
self from loss of advances made, had bought in the assets of a 
cotton oil refining concern and formed a corporation to conduct 
the business. The bank supplied the entire capital by giving 
the subsidiary a credit of $5,000 although the stockholders con- 
sisted solely of a vice-president, a stockholder, and the attorney 
for the bank. At the suggestion of a bank examiner, the bank, 
better to show the investment on its books, mortgaged the prop- 
erty of the new corporation to secure an issue of $75,000 princi- 
pal amount of bonds, all of which, apparently, were held by the 
bank. The manager of the subsidiary consulted with the officers 
of the bank and reported to them daily. Subsequent to the 
breach of warranty complained of, the bank, acting directly, 
made a lease of all the corporate property of the subsidiary and 
51 American Nat. Bank v. National Wall-Paper Co, 77 Fed. 85 (C. C. A. 
8th, 1896); Dobbins v. Pratt Chuck Co., 242 N. Y. 106, 151 N. E. 146 
(1926); Pullman Car Co. v. Missouri Pacific Co, 115 U. S. 587 (1885); 
Abney v. Belmont Country Club Properties, Inc., 279 Pac. 829 (Cal. App. 
1929). 
52George v. Rollins, 176 Mich. 144, 142 N. W. 337 (1913); Donovan 
v. Purtell, 216 11l. 629, 75 N. E. 334 (1905); Rice v. Sanger Bros., 27 
Ariz. 15, 229 Pac. 397 (1924). 
53 United States v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 220 U. S. 257, 31 Sup. Ct. 387 
(1911); United States v. Del. Lack. & West. R. R., 238 U.S. 516, 35 
Sup. Ct. 873 (1915); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minn. Civic Ass'n, 247 
U. S. 490, 38 Sup. Ct. 553 (1918); United States v. Reading Co., 253 
U. S. 26, 40 Sup. Ct. 425 (1919); United States v. United Shoe Machinery 
Co., 234 Fed. 127 (E. D. Mo. 1916); see So. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Int. 
Comm. Comm., 219 U. S. 498, 523, 31 Sup. Ct. 279, 286 (1911). 
? Bishop v. United States, 16 F. (2d) 410 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926). 
". 280 Fed. 879 (N. D. Ala. 1922). 
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in the lease gave the lessee an option to purchase all the assets. 
For a breach of warranty as to the quality of certain oil sold by 
the subsidiary, the bank was held liable. The stock ownership 
and common officers are clearly not determinative of the case and 
the subsidiary seems to have had no gross inadequacy of capital, 
but the facts show, aside from this, a considerable amount of 
direct intervention by the officers of the parent, as such, in the 
administration of the affairs of the subsidiary. Turning, on 
the other hand, to the famous Luckenbach case, 56 in which the 
Luckenbach Company was held liable for the default of the 
Luckenbach S. S. Company on its contract for the carriage of 
freight, there is no evidence of direct intervention in the affairs 
of the Steamship Company generally or in the transaction in- 
volved, although the usual factors of common stockholders and 
common officers are present. It does appear, however, that the 
Luckenbach Company had leased to its subsidiary for a period 
of from ten to twelve years the valuable fleet of steamships used 
for the carriage of freight. The rental, while more than nom- 
inal, was clearly below the rental value. To conduct the business 
of this large fleet the subsidiary had a capital of only ten thou- 
sand dollars as compared with a capital of $800,000 for the 
parent. Looking at these facts the court said, "It would be un- 
conscionable to allow the owner of this fleet of steamers, worth 
millions of dollars, to escape liability because it had turned them 
over a year before to a $10,000 corporation which is itself in 
another form." 
In another case 57 the usual indices of common stock ownership 
and common officers and directors appeared. The subsidiary 
used the office of the parent and the parent paid the expenses of 
office, bookkeeper, stenographer, etc. for both. The president and 
general manager of the parent, although not nominally an officer 
of the subsidiary, which had been organized to contract for and 
build a branch line of the parent, did intervene directly in the 
transaction involving the construction contract sued on by the 
plaintiff. The president took direct charge to the extent of con- 
ducting the negotiations for the contract between the subsidiary 
and the plaintiff and assured the plaintiff that the subsidiary was 
used by the parent to secure rights of way and was sort of a 
buffer between the parent and trouble, that the subsidiary was 
practically the same thing as the parent, the parent was behind 
it, and .the plaintiff would get his money. Likewise, he handled 
all questions arising under the contract, writing the plaintiff 
sometimes on the stationery of the parent and sometimes on that 
of the subsidiary. The capital of the subsidiary was $5,000 
6 Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676 (C. C. A. 
4th, 1920). 
57 Stark Elec. R. R. v. McGinty Contracting Co., supra note 49. 
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with $1,000 paid in, while that of the parent was $1,000,000. 
Impressed apparently by the amount of direct intervention in the 
transaction by the parent rather than by the disparity of cap- 
ital, since it pointed out that the subsidiary had been able to 
meet its obligations, the court held that the plaintiff believed his 
contract to be in reality with the parent but that the subsidiary, 
for the convenience of the parent and with the knowledge of all 
interested, was, respecting this contract, masquerading, acting 
for and set out substantially as the parent, and that the parent 
was liable. 
As indicated by the foregoing, an analysis of the cases seems 
to indicate that the courts are more impressed by an obvious 
inadequacy of capital on the part of the subsidiary than they are 
by the presence of any of the other indicia of identity between 
the corporations such as common officers and directors, lack of 
separate offices, books, etc. In fact, sufficient capital and ade- 
quate financial arrangements or the lack of it, insofar as the 
various factors motivating the court are capable of ascertain- 
ment from the cases, in some instances seems to be largely de- 
terminative.58 But, generally speaking, the customary indicia 
of identity which invariably appear as a basic array of facts, 
although in varying numbers and intensity, seem to leave the 
court cold, except as it marshalls them and states that they show 
the one corporation to be that vague thing an "alter ego," "ad- 
junct," or "instrumentality" of the other. It may be said that 
something further, generally something in the way of direct 
intervention by the parent in the transaction involved or in the 
conduct of the affairs of the subsidiary, or a desire to avoid that 
undefinable and unsatisfactory thing for purposes of prediction 
-an inequitable result-must be present before the claimant 
can look to the parent. 
An example of the sort of intervention referred to is that 
which occurred in the case of Dillard & Coffin Co. v. Richmond 
Cotton Oil Co.59 There a subsidiary was formed to carry on a 
cotton ginning business formerly conducted as a department of 
the parent. An option was given one Sugg to purchase the stock 
of the subsidiary, but the parent agreed to repurchase the stock 
or make loans upon it to its par value at any time. The parent 
caused the subsidiary to adopt a by-law which enabled the parent 
to discharge the board of directors of the subsidiary at any time 
and to elect new directors in conformity with its wishes. The 
officers of the subsidiary made daily reports to the parent of each 
transaction which it had. On more than one occasion the parent 
paid the financial obligations of the subsidiary. The parent 
58 First Nat. Bank v. Walton, 146 Wash. 367, 262 Pac. 984 (1928); 
Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., supra note 56. 59 140 Tenn. 290, 204 S. W. 758 (1918). 
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was held liable for the overplus of certain drafts drawn by the 
subsidiary against shipments of cotton and aggregating more 
than the value of the cotton when sold. Another instance 60 is 
that of a parent which was held not entitled to share in the 
assets of its bankrupt subsidiary for advances made and repre- 
sented by notes. The parent was capitalized at $400,000 and 
the subsidiary at $250,000, the parent's advances amounting to 
$147,000. There were common officers and directors. Annual 
meetings of the subsidiary were held at which directors were 
elected, but these transacted practically no business. The affairs 
of the subsidiary were controlled and managed directly by the 
parent, whose directors met monthly in New York for that pur- 
pose, at which times salaries and prices were fixed, finances ar- 
ranged and all other necessary business of the subsidiary trans- 
acted. 
In contrast there is the recent case of First Nat. Bank v. Wal- 
ton 61 where, in a suit'by certain banks against a solvent sub- 
sidiary on notes given against loans made to the subsidiary, the 
receivers of the insolvent parent intervened, sought to subject 
the assets of the subsidiary to their administration in the inter- 
ests of the creditors of both companies as a single insolvent con- 
cern, and claimed that the plaintiffs had no greater rights than 
as creditors of such single insolvent concern. Recovery was 
nevertheless allowed against the subsidiary as such. The sub- 
sidiary had been amply financed, having a capital stock of $250,- 
000 and a line of credit of $100,000 with each of the plaintiff 
banks secured by ninety day notes, certain of which were ulti- 
mately involved in this suit. The corporate relationship between 
the two corporations was as close as any which could well be 
devised. The wholly owned subsidiary had been formed to bet- 
ter finance and carry out the marketing of the output. There 
were practically the same officers and directors, the business was 
carried on from the office of the parent, and the stock of logs, 
lumber, etc. of the subsidiary was kept on the premises of the 
parent. Beyond this, however, there was no direct intervention 
by the parent or intermingling of the affairs of the two com- 
panies. The supply of logs and lumber was not indistinguish- 
able and there were separate books and separate bank accounts. 
The subsidiary carried on business, shipped, sold, and invoiced 
in its own name, and borrowed money and pledged security sep- 
arately. Undoubtedly the adequate capitalization and financial 
arrangements of the subsidiary had much to do with the decision, 
but in addition the lack of intermingling and direct intervention 
60 S. G. V. Co. of Delaware v. S. G. V. Co. of Pennsylvania, 264 Pa. 
265, 107 Atl. 721 (1919); cf. Hunter v. Baker Motor Vehicle Co., 225 
Fed. 1006 (N. D. N. Y. 1915), aff'd, 238 Fed. 894 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916). 
61 Supra note 58. 
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by the parent appears to have been compelling to the court. The 
recent case of Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. 
Co.62 was concerned with the attempt of a dry dock company to 
recover against the subsidiary for certain repairs, ordered by the 
parent, on a boat owned by the subsidiary but leased to the 
parent. The parent owned 2,095 of the 2,432 outstanding shares 
of the subsidiary. The subsidiary had purchased certain boats, 
including the vessel libeled, and finding it difficult to meet the 
payments, the parent had entered into a contract whereby both 
became liable for the payments instead of the subsidiary alone. 
The parent leased the boats from the subsidiary under a bare- 
boat charter at a rental which the court referred to as being de- 
pendent upon the will of the parent because of the control which 
it exercised over the subsidiary but which was not sufficiently 
inadequate to call forth further comment. Six of the nine direc- 
tors of the subsidiary were directors of the parent. Another was 
vice-president of the parent. The manager of the parent was 
also manager of the subsidiary. The business of each was sep- 
arate, however, in that the parent operated on the Erie Canal 
and the subsidiary in other waters, and nothing shows that the 
affairs of either company were immediately directed by the 
officers of the other. The court applied the test of direct inter- 
vention and held the subsidiary not liable, saying, 
"One corporation may, however, become an actor in a given 
transaction, or in part of a business, or in a whole business, and, 
when it has, will be legally responsible. To become so it must 
take immediate direction of the transaction through its officers, 
by whom alone it can act at all.... At times this is put as though 
the subsidiary then became an agent of the parent. This may no 
doubt be true, but only in quite other situations; that is, when 
both intend that relation to arise, for agency is consensual. This 
seldom is true, and liability normally must depend upon the 
parent's direct intervention in the transaction, ignoring the sub- 
sidiary's paraphernalia of incorporation, directors and officers. 
The test is therefore rather in the form than in the substance of 
the control; in whether it is exercised immediately, or by means 
of a board of directors and officers, left to their own initiative and 
responsibility in respect of each transaction as it arises. Some 
such line must obviously be drawn, if shareholding alone does 
not fuse the corporations in every case. Much of the metaphor 
in the books merely impedes discourse, as Judge Cardozo well ob- 
serves in Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry.; here, as elsewhere, it is 
ordinarily a symptom of confused thinking." 63 
Nevertheless, there are certain cases which defy solution by 
the foregoing test or by any other except the subjective one of 
"avoidance of an inequitable result." A reading of the opinions 
in such cases usually constrains one to the thought, or rather, the 
62 31 F. (2d) 265 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929). 
63 Ibid. 267. 
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feeling, that they were correctly decided to avoid the "inequi- 
table result." Yet it is not so clear that a set of facts, taken in 
the raw and before receiving the color necessarily imparted by a 
judge who has taken a slant on the question and is justifying his 
decision, would so readily indicate just where the "inequitable 
result" lies. So in Ambridge Borough v. Phila. Co.," the 
Borough sought to cause the parent to specifically perform the 
contract of one of its operating subsidiaries to pave between cer- 
tain car tracks. It appeared that the directors of the subsidiary 
were all employees of the parent and that they had the same 
officers; the parent advanced large sums of capital on open book 
account; the parent owned all outstanding bonds of the sub- 
sidiary as well as stock; the directors of the subsidiary met very 
irregularly and only to authorize important contracts; the parent 
provided power to the subsidiary through another subsidiary; 
the officers of the subsidiary, who were also the officers of the 
parent, took many important steps without action of the Board 
of Directors; and generally stated, there was unified control and 
operation. Now, certainly a court with little or no inclination to 
that end could here find intervention and the exercise of direct 
control by the parent, but the court paid no attention to this and, 
looking for and finding no "fraud or bad faith, unfair dealing, 
or the commission of unlawful acts" on the part of the parent, 
affirmed the dismissal of the bill as to it. A study of further 
cases brings to light examples where considerable direct inter- 
vention and control appears, but the court looks for "fraud" or 
"inequity" and decides on the basis of whether it considers it 
present or absent. 5 It further seems that "avoidance of an in- 
equitable result" is the only test, if it may be called such, which 
has any pertinence toward the explanation of the comparatively 
few cases in which a sole individual stockholder and his wholly 
owned corporation are considered as one, the courts in a proper 
case finding no difficulty in so treating them.6' 
From the foregoing it will be seen that where contractual 
rights are concerned the contents of any rules which may be 
stated to help in the work of prediction are but shifting and 
faintly outlined at the best, themselves uncertain subjects of 
predictability. This much, however, may be said: 
64 283 Pa. 5, 129 Atl. 67 (1925). 
65 Pittsburgh & Buffalo Co. v. Duncan, 232 Fed. 584 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916); 
In re Watertown Paper Co., 169 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 2d, 1909); of. Hunter 
v. Baker Motor Vehicle Co., supra note 60; In re Muncie Pulp Co., 139 
Fed. 546 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905). 
66 Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 (1921); Wenban Estate, 
Inc. v. Hewlett, 193 Cal. 675, 227 Pac. 723 (1924); Erkenbrecker v. Grant, 
187 Cal. 7, 200 Pac. 641 (1921); of. Wabash Ry. v. American Refrigerator 
Transit Co., 7 F. (2d) 335 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925). 
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(a) The adequacy or inadequacy of the capital and financial 
arrangements of the subsidiary weigh heavily in the determina- 
tion of liability or non-liability of the parent, greatly over- 
shadowing the other so-called indicia of identity between the 
companies such as common officers, directors, office and lack of 
separate books. 
(b) Direct intervention or intermeddling by the parent in the 
affairs of the subsidiary and more particularly in the transaction 
involved, to the disregard of the normal and orderly procedure of 
corporate control carried out through the election of the desired 
directors and officers of the subsidiary and the handling by them 
of the direction of its affairs, seems to have been determinative 
in some cases to holding the parent liable. 
(c) Nevertheless, in many cases direct intervention seems to 
have had no potency in swaying the courts. After considering 
the various facts indicating identity of the corporations and 
direct intervention they have decided according to their sub- 
jective idea of "avoiding an inequitable result." 
As yet the subject is covered with a "mist of metaphors." 
Until the courts stop to analyze with more particularity the fac- 
tors motivating their decisions before lapsing into phrases such 
as "alter ego" or "adjunct" or "instrumentality" there seems 
little hope of making prediction more certain than the foregoing. 
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